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Roundtable discussion facilitated by Mark William Westmoreland and 
Brien Karas, including Frédéric Worms, Michael Foley, Jimena Canales, 
Hisashi Fujita, Melissa McMahon, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Paulina 
Ochoa Espejo, Suzanne Guerlac, Charlotte de Mille, and Stephen Crocker. 
 
* 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: I’m joined by Brien Karas, and it is 
our hope that we will have a productive set of reflections in commemoration 
of 75 years since the death of Henri Bergson. With us are Jimena Canales, 
Stephen Crocker, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Michael Foley, Hisashi Fujita, 
Suzanne Guerlac, Melissa McMahon, Charlotte de Mille, Paulina Ochoa 
Espejo, and Frédéric Worms. Our plan is to consider a constellation of 
Bergsonian ideas and some extensions of those ideas. In our time together, 
we’ll discuss Bergson’s role in the League of Nations, his relationship with 
Einstein, and his views on science more generally. We’ll consider Bergson as 
a political thinker and what he said or might say about democracy, 
immigration, and political theology. We’ll explore Bergson’s influence on 
artists and those working in media studies. And, we’ll also reflect on 
translation issues and how to sort through the development of Bergson’s 
thought throughout his body of work. Welcome and thank you all for 
participating in this roundtable. 
 
BRIEN KARAS: Could you tell us how you became interested in Bergson? 
Were there certain ideas or themes that you were already working on that 
you sympathized with? How has his work influenced your own 
philosophical thinking? 
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FRÉDÉRIC WORMS: I have the weird feeling of having had an intuition—
something that clarifies itself only in retrospect and could not have been 
explained as such in the beginning except as an impulsion. Now I could say: 
yes, of course, Bergson is by all means a critical vitalist, which I also claim to 
be and advocate. But, at the same time, I would avoid his élan vital for being 
too substantial and metaphysical. In my opinion, his critical vitalism is 
obviously at its best in ethics and politics, with the critical distinction 
between the closed and the open, both stemming from life in its two sides. 
Unfortunately, very few scholars have even dared to mention the The Two 
Sources on Morality and Religion, which is where we get the most robust 
Bergsonian politics? Right, even Deleuze failed to go there. Now of course 
Bergson has a recognized obvious central place in all the philosophical 
formation of the century. But I began my own study of Bergson by giving 
him back his very philosophical legitimacy, let alone a historical role. Put 
differently, I felt that he was at a good historical distance from me, enabling 
me to understand the century philosophically as well as politically (in 
France and elsewhere). This is still true. When I return to Bergson, I sense 
the passage of time and the fecundity of thought within his own writing 
instead of pretending to view or perceive time as such. And, if I can say 
more about that, it is the posturing of both science or the phenomenology 
“of time,” which are no doubt useful in their own right, to quantify time is, 
and this, I think, is a mistake and an illusion, a deception and a loss. Bergson 
saw this early at a time when physics was supplanting biology as the 
dominant science. But of course it is only now that I can connect it with the 
two sides of our empirical life and the vital relationships that allow us this 
vital feeling of time, which is not a metaphysical substratum, but a vital and 
fragile experience of living beings in their environment and relationships. 
Without Bergson how could one get to all this? But did I “know”? Only now, 
in retrospect, but now for sure, and for good. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Frédéric here has gestured toward 
Bergson’s political thought. I want to ask you all about that. But, first, I’d 
like to hear if anyone has thoughts about Bergson’s involvement with the 
League of Nations and the International Committee on Intellectual 
Cooperation (ICIC). Bergson helped found the League and chaired the ICIC 
(precursor to UNESCO). What do you think Bergson’s assessment of the 
United Nations/UNESCO would be if he were alive today? Success? 
Failure? 
 
MICHAEL FOLEY: To be brief, I would just say that, as an energetic worker 
for the League of Nations and bitterly disappointed by its collapse, Bergson 
would be pleased by the European Union, though concerned at the threat 
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from the resurgence of nationalism, which he defined as group narcissism 
based on a need to feel superior. 
 
JIMENA CANALES: It is difficult to speculate about what Bergson would 
think about United Nations/UNESCO today, especially since he is one of 
the most important philosophers to stress the unforeseeable aspects of our 
future history. But what struck me the most while I was studying Bergson’s 
role as president of the ICIC within the League of Nations was how much he 
worked to include Albert Einstein. In The Physicist and the Philosopher: 
Einstein, Bergson and the Debate that Changed Our Understanding of Time, I 
explore how a debate between them on the nature of time that took place in 
Paris on April 6, 1922 was followed by a disagreement about the fate and 
role of the League. At first, I was surprised to learn that Einstein was such a 
negative critic of the League. Most scholars stress his pacifism and 
internationalism, so to see him take such a firm stance against the League at 
first came to me as a shock. But his behavior becomes less surprising if 
considered in relation to what he was trying to accomplish as a scientist. His 
assessment of the League was colored by his opinion of Bergson, who had 
just published a highly critical book, Duration and Simultaneity, confronting 
relativity theory. When Bergson resigned from the ICIC, he was succeeded 
by the physicist Hendrik Lorentz. Einstein also had a complicated 
relationship with Lorentz, who had worked on relativity theory years before 
Einstein and who was the author of the famous relativity equations Einstein 
used. Both Lorentz and Bergson did not accept all of the conclusions that 
Einstein was drawing from relativity theory. Key players in the League’s 
upper management were not buying Einstein’s work whole cloth. How do 
you think he felt about that? 
 This historical episode is an ideal case to study the relation between 
science and politics. Time is just not one of those things that tends to stay in 
one of the two compartments. Time undergirds our basic structures of 
governmentality and sociability (necessary for the organization of events, 
from pragmatic meetings to symbolic rituals). The institutions in charge of 
the determination and distribution of time are political corporations as much 
as they are scientific ones. Bergson’s ICIC faced competition from the 
International Research Council (IRC) that eventually fulfilled many of its 
functions, including the formation of International Time Commission and 
the International Time Bureau. The IRC, through the International 
Astronomical Union (ICU), voted to start defining time in the same way that 
Einstein defined it in his own work, by reference to lightwaves, and 
eventually became the dominant way of defining time. So it is as much of a 
mistake to think of Bergson’s time at the ICIC as of exclusively political 
interest as it is to think of Einstein’s view of the ICIC and the League in those 
terms as well. One might think that how we define time here on Earth has a 
secondary relation to the nature of time itself. That one is social, practical, 
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and, to some extent, conventional while what physicists and cosmologists 
get at is transcendental and universal. But the two are intimately related. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: I want to push this further. In what 
sense is Bergson a political thinker? Bergson is not explicitly a political 
thinker, but his thought has important political implications. In The Two 
Sources, Bergson writes, “Mankind lies groaning, half crushed beneath the 
weight of its own progress. Men do not sufficiently realize that their future 
is in their own hands. Theirs is the task of determining first of all whether 
they want to go on living or not? Theirs the responsibility, then, for deciding 
if they want merely to live, or intend to make just the extra effort required 
for fulfilling, even on their refractory planet, the essential function of the 
universe, which is a machine for the making of gods.” In Time and Free Will 
his argument against determinism grounds the possibility of free action and 
feeling, implicitly presupposing that a deterministic framework of thought is 
a foil for the concentration of power. His critical analysis of abstract thinking 
has political value today in that it resists the hegemony of a data based 
epistemology. Bergson’s emphasis on the concrete, the singular, and the 
qualitative resists the authority of data in a world that tends more and more 
toward an informational ontology—an ontology of bits and codes. In The 
Two Sources he associates logics of environmentally unsustainable economic 
practices with political conflict and injustice. 
 
HISASHI FUJITA: In an extra-ordinary sense of a political philosophy of life: 
“Let us then give to the word biology the very wide meaning [le sens très 
compréhensif] it should have, and will perhaps have one day, and let us say in 
conclusion that all morality, be it pressure or aspiration, is in essence 
biological.” Otherwise, in an ecological sense, we could give to this word a 
sufficient precision of living together. “Living together” does not mean any 
communitarian implication, but rather a radical reconsideration of being-
with. We must take his formula very seriously, that is, literally: “[The great 
moral leaders] ask nothing, and yet they receive. They have no need to 
exhort; their mere existence suffices.” Literally he says “leur existence est un 
appel.” From his insistant metaphors of Echo, we must develop some 
political philosophy of “echo-sistence,” some politics of emotion based less 
on the individuality than the personality of “per-sono,” of sounding-
through. “Thus do pioneers in morality proceed. Life holds for them 
unsuspected tones of feeling like those of some new symphony, and they 
draw us after them into this music that we may express it in action.” 
Perhaps too unrealistic or idealistic, this “echo-sistence” or “per-sonality,” 
however, will be contemporary (that is, untimely in the sense of Nietzsche) 
and critical for our time. Furthermore, we could think about, for example, 
the validity, in this globalization, of a political concept of “dividual,” which 
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Deleuze in his famous essay on the society of control suggested in contrast 
with “individual.” 
 
MELISSA MCMAHON: I think that Mark’s quote from The Two Sources is 
more indicative of the ways Bergson is not a political thinker rather than the 
reverse. It concludes a meditation on the possibility that “psychical 
research” could open the doors of our perception to a life beyond death and 
spread supernatural joy throughout the world. It’s a religious or mystical 
vision rather than a political one, a dream of a heaven on earth that by 
definition transcends politics. It’s an extreme example of the way Bergson 
tends to focus on humanity as a species and transformations on an 
evolutionary level rather than in terms of political reform. That said, it 
doesn’t mean others don’t find political inspiration in Bergson’s work. I 
translated Bachir’s book on Muhammad Iqbal, a major political and 
philosophical figure known as the “spiritual father of Pakistan.” Iqbal 
studied in Europe and was immensely influenced by Bergson, which is what 
the book examines, as indicated by its title: Islam and Open Society: Fidelity 
and Movement in the Thought of Muhammad Iqbal. It would be interesting to 
know whether Iqbal’s approach still has any currency in the Islamic world 
today.  
 
SOULEYMANE BACHIR DIAGNE: I’m glad Melissa mentioned this. I have 
devoted some work to the convergence between Iqbal, the Muslim reformer, 
and Bergson. It is generally assumed that Bergson is not a thinker of the 
political. Well, it could be said that our times constitute the best response to 
such a view and manifest the political import of the oppositions he made 
between the open or dynamic religion on the one hand and the closed 
religion on the other hand, the closed society and the open society. 
That a human religion, that is a religion which sustains the human 
being in her becoming fully who she has to be, must continuously remain an 
open, dynamic religion is indeed a philosophical and political message for 
our times. Iqbal who insisted on the need for a “reconstruction of the 
religious thought of Islam” (that is the title of his major work in prose) found 
in Bergson the only contemporary philosopher who has made “a keen 
study” of time as duration. Such a philosophy of time was particularly 
important for the Indian Muslim reformer as he insisted that, only by 
reconnecting with its own dynamic, continuously emerging cosmology, will 
Islam be again one with its own principle of movement and develop as a 
living reality in step with the continuous newness that defines life. Iqbal, 
whose message needs today more than ever to be heard by Muslims, 
certainly understood the political import of a dynamic religion.  
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PAULINA OCHOA ESPEJO: Of course, Bergson does not devote many 
pages explicitly to politics, but he is a political thinker according to most 
definitions. In The Two Sources he deals with issues closely related to 
government, administration, and power. He also discusses how and why 
people establish legal obligations, and how we make groups that often war 
with each other. Yet, unlike those theorists who see the realm of politics as 
exclusively about those issues, Bergson also reflects on ideals of political 
morality that transcends legal obligations. He also considers why and how 
we espouse ideals of universal morality that occasionally create solidarity 
beyond groups.  
 There is one more sense in which Bergson is a political thinker: he 
gives an account of how politics is connected to other facets of human life 
and thought. By connecting politics to his theory of the relation between 
nature and culture (a parallel we find in Creative Evolution) and also to a 
complete metaphysical system (in Matter and Memory and Time and Free 
Will), he underscores the importance of metaphysics to morality, religion, 
and politics. Reading Bergson forces us to re-think liberal commitments and 
the views of contemporary “post-metaphysical” thinkers. 
 
SUZANNE GUERLAC: On a different level than Time and Free Will, it is 
politically significant that in Creative Evolution, Bergson does not place the 
human being as the final aim of evolution as Herbert Spencer had done in a 
gesture of extreme humanism. Here consciousness is not limited to humans: 
“The humblest organism is conscious to the extent that it moves freely.” This 
invites a consideration of the post human and requires us to make a 
distinction between different ways of understanding it. We can take it in the 
direction of the cyborg, that is of the hybridization of the human and the 
machine (or of the “natural” and the “artificial,” or technological) and 
construe this as an “evolutionary” adaptation to effects of human progress. 
Or we can take it to invite a shift away from the project of relentless 
instrumentalization of the planet for human use and financialization in favor 
of prioritizing the sustainability of livingness. This is a political choice 
because what I would call the “Spencerian” alternative (the cyborg version 
of the post-human) supports the neoliberal subjectivation of what Foucault 
calls Homo economicus and the dynamics of global capitalism which 
increasingly include, among other forms of injustice, the ravages of 
environmental injustice. The Anthropocene, characterized by mass 
extinctions and tipping points with respect to the sustainable operation of 
the biosphere, is itself a political matter. It implies an instrumentalization of 
the planet that operates according to a neoliberal fiction of infinite economic 
growth that in actuality advances the accumulation of wealth on the part of 
the very few. Bergson’s lucidity with respect to all of this in The Two Sources 
in striking.  
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 Bergson’s thought has political implications today as a contribution to 
(or framework for) ecological thought. In his early work Bergson posits a 
radical distinction between living beings, in which time penetrates matter, 
and things. In Creative Evolution, however, he both ontologizes the force of 
time as duration (figured as the élan vital) and extends its reach throughout 
the biosphere. Duration, he writes, extends to “the totality of the material 
universe.” He repeatedly insists on the relation between local sites (or 
rhythms) of duration and the dynamic relational totality of the biosphere. 
When, in the Two Sources, he implicitly challenges Durkheim’s emphasis on 
the national frame of collective solidarity, and addresses the question of an 
ethics of humanity as a whole, he invites us to imagine an “open” society. 
His analysis doubles his earlier theory of the élan vital with a creative 
affective force (he calls it love) that would pass through subjects to all living 
beings. This too is compatible with an ecological politics—perhaps the only 
sustainable politics today—that invites a respect and care for livingness. I 
think this is what is at stake when Bergson declares, at the end of The Two 
Sources, that humanity must decide whether it wants to continue to live.  
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Politics is often thought of in relation 
to a second aspect of human experience: politics and economics, politics and 
religion, politics and technology. There is also work on politics and 
aesthetics, for instance, done by Adorno, Brecht, Deleuze, and Rancière. 
Charlotte, can you speak more generally about Bergson and art? Does 
Bergson offer a philosophy of art? If you had to pick one of Bergson’s texts 
that lends itself to a philosophy art, which would it be? Why? Does art offer 
a better, or simply different, way of reasoning than science? 
 
CHARLOTTE DE MILLE: Bergson never completed a separate philosophy 
of art, although his contemporary Matthew Stewart Prichard was misled to 
believe that he might, and relayed it with excitement to his great friend 
Isabella Gardner. In fact, any idea of a separate philosophy of art would of 
course have been contrary to Bergson’s thinking. For Bergson art is a way of 
life that cannot be thought of disconnected from our experience. 
 All of Bergson’s major texts hold nuggets of an aesthetic theory, 
starting with Time and Free Will, where Bergson discussed aesthetic emotion 
and the artist’s method for its realization. 
 In Creative Evolution, he made a claim for philosophy to approach its 
subject in the same manner as the artist. Rather than choose a text however, I 
would rather choose Bergson’s method of intuition. For me this was what 
distinguished him particularly from other contemporary philosophers, and 
is where an artistic vision and a philosophical one meet. According to British 
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critic T.E. Hulme it was also this that signaled a change in philosophy to 
being grounded in art rather than science. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Can you give a few examples of how 
Bergson directly influenced artists, for example, Wyndham Lewis and, in 
this particular case, how Lewis changed his position regarding Bergson? 
 
CHARLOTTE DE MILLE: There are so many, so I’ll restrict myself to British 
examples. For the Rhythmist group of Scots artist J. D. Fergusson, English 
critic John Middleton Murry, and others, Bergson’s notorious concept of 
vital impetus, the élan vital, was transformed into a regeneration of spiritual, 
and broadly Christian, values. Lewis, representing (and dominating) 
Vorticism, subverted both Bergson’s experiential time, or duration, and his 
theory of open evolution to present the counter effects of psychological and 
evolutionary degradation. He’s a complex figure though and regarding his 
change in detail, it’s best to look at my article in Understanding Bergson 
Understanding Modernism. Lewis’s anxiety about those who most influenced 
him most went beyond Bergson however, and Lisa Siraganian has shown 
Lewis using very similar tactics at work in relation to Gertrude Stein. In 
contrast to these distortions, Roger Fry arguably offers a direct transposition 
of Bergson’s analysis of perception as physical sensation from Matter and 
Memory into his work on aesthetics.  
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Hisashi, in “Anarchy and Analogy: 
The Violence of Language in Bergson and Sorel,” you described how Jean 
Paulhan viewed “Bergson as the person who gave philosophical expression 
to this terrorism,” that is, the work of misology by those, “wary of language 
as, in their opinion, inherently dangerous to thought.” Does Bergson have a 
philosophy of language? If so, how does it lend itself to political purposes? 
 
HISASHI FUJITA: Yes, he has in fact, but a paradoxical one. On one hand, as 
a great writer elaborating his elegant style and weaving subtle convincing 
metaphors or analogies, Bergson received the Nobel Prize in 1927. Without 
recalling a famous example of “if I want to mix a glass of sugar and water,” 
it is no doubt that his theory got its vital force partly but certainly from his 
writing. But on the other hand, Bergson severely criticized Homo loquax, “the 
only one to which I am antipathique”: “My initiation into the true 
philosophical method began the moment I threw overboard verbal 
solutions, having found in the inner life an important field of experiment.” 
This is why I would be tempted to say that his philosophy of language is a 
kind of “vanishing mediator” only by being thrown below or beyond 
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language. “We call intuition,” Bergson says, “here the sympathy by which 
one is transported into the interior of an object in order to coincide with what 
there is unique and consequently inexpressible in it.” This transport of 
intuition-sympathy must not be an ordinary language nor a simple verbal 
communication but, almost in the sense of a French expression “transports 
amoureux,” something to express the inexpressible. Mobilizing metaphors, 
analogies, images, and rhythms in a process of incarnation from ideas to 
language, from language into a lecturer’s thought, Bergsonian tropes vanish 
their expression infinitely [évanouissement], but by flourishing thought 
[épanouissement]: “But what we shall manage to recapture and to hold is a 
certain intermediary image between the simplicity of the concrete intuition 
and the complexity of the abstractions which translate it, a receding and 
vanishing image, which haunts, unperceived perhaps, the mind of the 
philosopher, which follows him like his shadow through the ins and outs of 
his thought and which, if it is not the intuition itself, approaches it much 
more closely than the conceptual expression, of necessity symbolical, to 
which the intuition must have recourse in order to furnish ‘explanation.’ Let 
us look closely at this shadow: by doing so we shall guess the attitude of the 
body which projects it.” If Bergson employs often the terms of “shadow” or 
“suggestion,” it is perhaps for a singular mode of existence, év/panouissement 
of metaphors. Therefore, stressing the essential moment of metaphors, 
analogies, and images, it is Bergson himself who points out their own limits. 
 In fact, we could not understand the exact reason of his wide, positive 
or negative, reception from various political thinkers (say, from Georges 
Sorel to Carl Schmitt, from Horkheimer to Arendt), if we did not take into 
account the linguistic dimension of Bergson’s philosophy, his thought and 
performance on/by language—“transports amoureux” are attractive and 
dangerous, vital and mortal, productive and destructive—, what we call 
“violence of language” (symbolic abstraction/metaphoric attraction) in his 
writings. Actually, they feel there something effectively and politically 
performative. 
 
BRIEN KARAS: Does Bergson have something to offer, to challenge, our 
contemporary intellectual field? What extensions of Bergson’s thought are 
worth pursuing today? Michael, you wrote Life Lessons from Bergson. Do you 
want to go first? 
 
MICHAEL FOLEY: What would Bergson make of the present scene? He 
would be disappointed to see that many of the tendencies he deplored have 
persisted and intensified—but heartened also to see that these tendencies 
have provoked many of the reactions he himself advocated, especially in 
science. It could be argued that science has come round to a completely 
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Bergsonian view of matter, life, and the cosmos, not from a study of Bergson 
but possibly from the diffusion of his ideas into the culture. 
 As a critic of instrumentalism, convinced that wellbeing is qualitative 
rather than quantitative, he would be grimly amused by the rise of a 
movement known as The Quantified Self, which believes that the key to 
wellbeing is monitoring and measuring as many bodily functions as 
possible, but probably surprised that the bookshops of the Western world 
are full of books advocating mindfulness as a technique for escaping the 
limitations imposed by instrumentalism and utilitarianism. 
 As to which aspect of Bergson’s thought would be most useful 
nowadays, I think that his original approach to religion would be a 
refreshing counter to the rise of fundamentalism and the split between 
militant believers and equally militant atheists. Religion is generally 
understood to be static, a set of doctrines and practices that must be 
accepted as absolute and eternal, but Bergson argued that this is yet another 
example of the yearning for fixity and stability. There is no eternal truth and 
therefore no basis for the righteousness of those who believe themselves to 
be the sole possessors of it. Morality and religion are dynamic, created rather 
than revealed—and created not by institutions but by exceptional 
individuals making it up as they go along. So the inconsistencies of the New 
Testament, which appear to be a weakness, are actually its strength, and the 
crucial quality of Christ was not virtue but vitality. Preaching virtue is a 
waste of time. It is the vitality of the teacher that makes the teaching heard 
and followed. 
 The most personal application was Bergson’s point that the 
personality tends to harden over time into something fixed, often crankily, 
even laughably, eccentric, and almost always angry. Any system, either a 
society or an individual, that shuts itself off to “ferment in a closed vessel” 
becomes defensive, suspicious, and eventually angry.  
 But Bergson’s relevance goes beyond any specific application to 
encourage a general change of attitude, a desire to live more intensely, not 
by dramatic adventures, but by getting more out of everyday experience 
through paying proper attention to it. He advocates, and demonstrates in his 
work, enthusiasm, vitality, energy, joy, and even optimism—qualities not 
easy to find and especially not in serious philosophy. Enthusiasm is 
generally regarded as naïve, joy as embarrassing, and optimism as the sign 
of a half-wit. 
 
STEPHEN CROCKER: For me, Bergson’s ideas alert us to the affective 
nature of new media environments and the kind of perception they require. 
We now live in an endless current of images, sounds, and information. A 
century ago, Paul Valery’s vision of images directly transferred into the 
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home was dazzlingly futuristic. Now our homes, offices, and life worlds 
have been transformed into devices for coordinating and synthesizing 
multiple sources of information from widely dispersed environments. Even 
the car, once the symbol of our atomized isolation from each other, is now a 
central network access point to complex global systems. The over-saturated 
informational context is not just an aspect of globalization, but its very 
precondition. All the familiar kinds of globalization—economic, social, 
technological—require that we be present in one situation and, at the same 
time, attune to a number of other background ones that originate elsewhere. 
Bergson’s theory of multiplicity informs some of the most influential ideas of 
global connectedness, such as rhizomatic formations, global flows, and the 
multitude celebrated by Negri and Hardt. 
 Bergson’s theory of subtractive perception, however, has received less 
attention, but is equally illuminating for understanding the media rich 
environments in which we now live.  
  In Matter and Memory Bergson contests the common “associationist” 
notion that perception consists of discrete sensations, plus the attention we 
bring to them. Descartes, for instance, had insisted that perception begins 
with clear and distinct simple ideas, from which we build up to more 
complex forms. Bergson, on the other hand, argues that perception is a 
subtractive operation. When we set out to know, we are already adrift in a 
mass of sensations. We always find ourselves already thrown into a 
multiplicity (a virtual totality) of affects that lack clear outlines and 
divisions. To perceive in this environment, we do not add together bits of 
information. Just the opposite is true. We subtract from this mass of 
sensation what does not interest us or what is not useful for life. From out of 
the mass we divide sensations into groups, categories, distinct things, or 
actualities. 
 What we experience as a discrete sensation (a sound for example) is 
the result of our dividing up a multiplicity of sensations. What presents itself 
to us as a clear signal is produced by our act of cutting up a dense, unclear 
signal. Perception moves from a virtual, over-determined mass to a clear 
and distinct signal that is subtracted from it. The selection of a signal, 
however, in turn changes the wider ecology of sensations and makes it 
possible to link it up with others in another, different configuration.  
 Bergson’s model of subtractive perception offers a paradigm for 
understanding what we might loosely call the phenomenology of complex 
perceptions and, more generally for approaching the social and sensual 
world as active milieus, transformative agents, capacitators, and resonating 
intervals. 
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HISASHI FUJITA: First of all, and generally speaking, Bergson’s challenge 
consists in his position between metaphysics and sciences, what Henri 
Gouhier called “nouvelle alliance de la métaphysique et des sciences.” In our day, 
there are many philosophers trying to verify the theoretical validity of a 
philosophical doctrine with a scientific theory, but not so many discuss and 
collaborate with scientists from their own philosophical point of view. 
Bergson’s contrast with Deleuze could be a good example. Using often a 
second literature of science, Deleuze’s aim is to develop his own 
metaphysics and neither to show his critique of any scientific theory nor to 
propose a scientific alternative (except in his collaboration with Guattari). 
On the contrary, going directly to the primary scientific literature of his time, 
Bergson’s critique of any scientific theory is inseparable from his 
metaphysical development. Enough would be two examples of a 
“mechanics of transformation” in Creative Evolution and of a “vitalist biology 
quite different from ours” in Mind-Energy. Let us not forget, it is through this 
collaboration/confrontation with sciences, it is from this attitude, in fact, 
quite unique and rare, that one derives what Gouhier called “une nouvelle 
intelligibilité,” I would like to add, a new sensibility of time, of memory, of 
life, of humanity. Since 2007, the members of Project Bergson in Japan have 
tried precisely to inherit from Bergson this kind of challenge. (See our three 
previous proceedings, namely Disséminations de l’Evolution créatrice, 
“Bergson et le désastre: Lire Les deux sources de la morale et de la 
religion au Japon aujourd’hui” in the 6th volume of Annales bergsoniennes, 
and Tout ouvert: L’Evolution créatrice en tous sens). And the proceedings we 
published this year under the direction of Yasushi Hirai, who led our team, 
would be a good example. This publication handles the relation between 
Bergson and contemporary theories of perception, mind, and time, 
especially featuring analytic traditions. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Several of you have mentioned 
science. Explain Bergson’s relation to science, particularly at the time when 
physics was supplanting biology as the premier science. Jimena, perhaps 
you could say a few words describing the exchange between Bergson and 
Einstein for those who may not be familiar. 
 
JIMENA CANALES: It is a mistake to characterize Bergson as anti-science or 
anti-relativity. What was interesting for me while writing my book was to 
track how that reputation came to be gospel. His debate with Einstein is 
again key here. Bergson was in conversation with top-relativity scientists of 
his time (Poincaré who worked on it well before Einstein, Lorentz who was 
the author of the relativity equations, and Albert Michelson of the famous 
Michelson-Morley experiment that became central to relativity). He 
repeatedly claimed that he accepted all of the physical results of relativity 
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theory. In a footnote to the main text, he explained that he fully accepted 
“the invariance of the electromagnetic equations.” None of his claims in 
Duration and Simultaneity were meant to bear on physics: “The theory was 
studied with the aim of responding to a question posed by a philosopher, 
and no longer by a physicist,” he said. “Physics,” he added, “was not 
responsible for answering that question.” Bergson simply did not want to 
accept that Einstein’s interpretation of relativity theory provided all answers 
about the nature of time. In this respect, his assessment of the physicist’s 
work was in fact quite mainstream and shared by many scientists. 
 Einstein responded by claiming that Bergson had made a mistake in 
terms of physics. He wrote various letters expressing that point that sealed 
Bergson’s reputation. But what is most interesting is that there is some 
evidence to suggest that Einstein did not fully believe that Bergson got his 
facts all wrong. In his journal, he wrote that Bergson had “grasped the 
substance of relativity theory and doesn’t set himself in opposition to it.” 
 
MICHAEL FOLEY: Bergson’s ideas are everywhere in contemporary science 
but almost never acknowledged by scientists. In fact, the only 
acknowledgement I know is by the geneticist Mae-Wan Ho in her book, The 
Rainbow and the Worm: The Physics of Organisms. Bergson had nothing but 
respect for science and all his scientific speculations have been vindicated by 
subsequent research. 
 His most daring assertion was that not even the atom is solid—this 
was well before the splitting of the atom—and physics has now come to 
accept his view of matter as not so much substance as a shimmying skein of 
force fields where the elementary particles are not solid but only 
perturbations, moving disturbances in the fields, whose motion alters the 
fields which in turn alter the particles, in configurations that never repeat. 
Bergson often sounds just like a contemporary physicist, and contemporary 
physicists sound just like Bergson. Consider the following two quotes: “So 
matter resolves itself into countless vibrations, all linked together in 
uninterrupted continuity, all influencing each other.” And, “Every entity in 
the universe evolves dynamically in interaction with everything else.” The 
second sounds more like Bergson and the first more like a physicist but it’s 
the other way round—the second is from the contemporary physicist Lee 
Smolin. So physics now promotes Bergson’s theory of matter and has also 
endorsed his rejection of determinism with the revelation that, at the 
quantum level, behavior is random and unpredictable. 
 In biochemistry the discovery of non-equilibrium systems, which 
preserve the illusion of stable structure by means of flow, like a vortex of 
water over a plughole, matches exactly Bergson’s view of life: “Like eddies 
of dust raised by the wind in its passing, the living turn upon themselves, 
borne up by the great blast of life. Therefore, they are relatively stable, and 
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fake immutability so well that we treat each as a thing rather than a process, 
forgetting that the very permanence of their form is only the outline of a 
movement.” 
 And biology, identified by Bergson as a key discipline at a time when 
physics was dominant and biology had little prestige, has moved away from 
seeing organisms as static assemblies of relatively autonomous parts, like 
machines, to understanding them as dynamic systems in which everything 
depends on everything else. Here is Bergson sounding just like a 
contemporary biologist: “The study of one of these organisms therefore 
takes us round in a circle, as if everything was a means to everything else.” 
But biology has not entirely escaped what Bergson described as “the logic of 
solids.” In a recent book on the origins of life, The Vital Question, the 
biochemist Nick Lane claims that recent biology has been obsessed with the 
gene because the gene can be seen as concrete, static, and deterministic, 
whereas the essence of life is energy flow. In other words, life is not 
substance but process—pure Bergson. Here is Bergson sounding like Lane: 
“So all life, animal and vegetable, seems to be in essence an effort to 
accumulate energy and let it flow into flexible channels, changeable in 
nature, to accomplish infinitely varied kinds of work.” 
 And as well as these correspondences with specific disciplines, two of 
the most influential recent general scientific paradigms—chaos theory and 
emergence—are entirely Bergsonian. Chaotic systems are driven by complex 
feedback loops where overlapping influences go in circles, and are sensitive 
to tiny changes in input (examples include weather, the stock market, and 
marriage). In emergent systems complex order emerges from simple 
components obeying simple rules (examples include ant colonies, cities, and, 
possibly, consciousness). 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: What is mechanical thought? 
Mechanism is defined not by any telos, but rather by a certain logic of 
organization. These logics of mechanism, in all its various forms, whether 
technical, philosophical, or aesthetic, are about the relation of means and 
ends. Marshall McLuhan provided a concise definition of mechanism as “a 
model of aggregation [which is] is achieved by fragmentation of any process 
and by putting the fragmented pieces in a series.” Does Bergson’s criticism 
of mechanical thought imply that Bergson is a techno-pessimist? On the one 
hand, Bergson did rant against industrialism and mechanization frequently, 
and very much so in The Two Sources. One the other hand, he was no 
different from many intellectuals of that time, such as Freud, who quickly 
saw an undeniable connection between technology and militarization. But 
we need to read these more superficial and moralistic criticisms in terms of 
previous and subtler comments about technology. Already in Matter and 
Memory it is clear that we cannot think of technology, or of anything else for 
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that matter, as standing on a different ontologically plane from our most 
intimate selves. 
 
HISASHI FUJITA: More than that! As initiator of a hidden tradition of “non-
organic vitalism,” with Canguilhem, Simondon, and Deleuze, Bergson 
developed his “organology”: “Thus, all the elementary forces of the intellect 
tend to transform matter into an instrument of action, that is, in the 
etymological sense of the word, into an organ. Life, not content with 
producing organisms, would fain give them as an appendage inorganic 
matter itself, converted into an immense organ by the industry of the living 
being.” His famous theory of Homo faber would lose its meaning, if we did 
not take into consideration this connection of life and industry. If I may read 
one more passage: “But the revolution it has effected in industry has 
nevertheless upset human relations altogether. New ideas are arising, new 
feelings are on the way to flower. In thousands of years, when, seen from the 
distance, only the broad lines of the present age will still be visible, our wars 
and our revolutions will count for little […]; but the steam-engine, and the 
procession of inventions of every kind that accompanied it, will perhaps be 
spoken of as we speak of the bronze or of the chipped stone of prehistoric 
times […]. Above all, [an instrument] reacts on the nature of the being that 
constructs it; for in calling on him to exercise a new function, it confers on 
him, so to speak, a richer organization, being an artificial organ by which the 
natural organism is extended.” Re-reading the second chapter of Creative 
Evolution would be the key for this topic. 
 
STEPHEN CROCKER:  Whether it takes the form of the factory production 
of commodities or the organization of shots in a film, mechanism is a 
medium in which any given whole—Greek or Christian ideas of unity, 
peasant life worlds, or the human body itself—is disassembled and rendered 
into a set of discrete, atomic units that can be reorganized over and again to 
serve some new purpose. This is true whether the mechanism we are 
speaking of is the complex body of a farm animal that is broken down into a 
set of routine, predictable functions, or a worker who becomes a quantity of 
labor time. It is present in the modern image of the mind as a machine that 
links together the clear and distinct ideas of Descartes or the separate sense 
impressions of Hume. We find this logic of decomposition and 
reconstruction in the fifteenth-century aesthetic revolution of perspective, 
which builds a painting of distinct planes, and the later, more modern 
development of filmic montage that reconstructs actions from discrete 
photographic cells. The “mechanical” dimension of each of these 
developments is defined not by the particular kind of device that it employs, 
but by this operation of dissolving wholes into atomic units and 
reassembling them into new aggregate forms.  
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 At the turn of the twentieth century, many people were complaining 
about the inhuman, alienating quality of modern mechanical thought, 
whether this meant the indifference of capitalism to the life of the worker 
whose time it divides into quantified units, the spiritless dissection of nature 
into a productive machine that serves our purposes, or the bland image of 
the mind as a machine that processes distinct ideas. For some, this led to a 
rejection of modernity and a desire to return to the world we had lost. For 
others, the problem was knowing toward what end all the frenetic 
movement of industrial life might be heading.  
 Bergson’s relation to mechanical modernity is refreshingly different. 
He shows us how the “mechanical thought” that reorganizes modern life 
emerges out of a long historical struggle to break up older Greek and 
Christian ideas of unity. Mechanism accomplished only a limited, 
incomplete revolution because it did not develop an adequate 
understanding of time and intervals. When science set out to explain 
movement without reference to any external, otherworldly cause, it 
presupposed a concept of time as not only a measure of a pre-given motion, 
but also as a generative force of invention and differentiation. Science breaks 
down unities into sets of sterile elements of T1, T2, and so on. Every element, 
or moment counts, and no one of them is more important than any other. 
Any given unity—material or ideal—can be dissected into a series of “any-
moments-whatever.” “Any” moment because the instant itself has no special 
telos or specific way of dividing ups the whole. A moment is a function of 
the set in which it participates. In order that change be initiated and pass 
along a line of these instants, however, the first instant, T1, must possess the 
capacity both to exhaust itself and to generate the conditions for the second 
instant, T2. This supposes some milieu, or medium in which the two 
elements participate together. What science did not provide was an analysis 
of this medium or “whole’” in which “any moments whatever” work 
together to produce a cumulative effect. And because it did not develop its 
own concept of change, it could not help but to carry along the ancient 
image of time as a static and accomplished fact. Because it does not bear on 
the interval, but only on its extremities (T1, T2), scientific knowledge must 
appeal to another knowledge of intervals to complete it. 
 Bergson’s critique of mechanism is not the work of a reactionary 
thinker, or techno-pessimist as you put it. In fact, the opposite is true: with 
the concepts of duration and creative evolution, he wants to carry forward 
the revolution in thought and experience that science and mechanism began, 
but did not complete. In short, his project is to develop the metaphysics that 
mechanical thought presupposes but does not think.  
 
JIMENA CANALES: We have some stellar work done on Bergson and 
evolution, and I am hoping that someone will soon write an entire volume 
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on Bergson and Darwin (with Spencer as an intermediary, of course). That 
book, to be any good, would approach the question of mechanism in a way 
that shows its deep imbrication with that of humanism, and that does not 
assume a clear and undisputed boundary between machine and human. It 
would have to be written from what we now would call a post-human 
perspective, but the purpose of such approach would not be to follow a 
recent academic trend, but because only in that way would it do full justice 
to their work. 
 
SUZANNE GUERLAC: I think what he would say is just what he says at the 
conclusion of The Two Sources when he declares, “Une décision s’impose. 
L’humanité gémit, à demi écrasée sous le poids des progrès qu’elle a faits. Elle ne sait 
pas assez que son avenir depend d’elle. A elle de voir d’abord si elle veut continuer à 
vivre.” A decision is before us. It is up to us to decide if we want to continue 
to live. Our own technocractic world is the fruit of the spirit of intelligence 
and rationality whose prerogative Bergson challenges in all his work. He 
does not challenge its value as such but he insists on setting boundaries with 
respect to it. It does not give us knowledge of the living real. It simply 
imposes instrumentally useful frameworks upon the real that lead us into a 
fabulous dream of mastery of the world. We have seen where that dream 
has lead us. The dream of technical mastery fits well with dreams of global 
capitalism. Except that capitalism needs to be able to bet on the future.  
 And I think for us to decide to do so requires the kind of shift in 
perspective that Bergson introduces through what he calls mysticité. This is 
perhaps not so mysterious. It comes down to an affective experience (an 
experience of love) that passes through us to embrace all living beings. This 
is the decision that faces us in the Anthropocene Age. We can call it by 
another name—ecological thinking, perhaps. But it will require shifting 
away from the absolute privilege given to human reason and to human 
interests. It will require the gesture Bergson repeatedly makes, which is to 
shift the reach of our thinking to the living biosphere.  
 
MELISSA MCMAHON: I think Bergson sees the human species itself as 
fundamentally mechanistic and technocratic. A lot of his argument is that 
our intellect is a tool, just like physical tools, rather than a transparent 
window onto the world. In that sense, the world has always been 
technocratic, but obviously the sophistication and impact of that technology 
has increased exponentially since Bergson’s death. That said, our concerns 
about human progress are very similar now to those in Bergson’s time: 
concerns that we will exhaust our natural resources, concerns that, despite 
technology’s power to improve our lives, it can also become tyrannical and 
aggravate social divisions.  
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MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Melissa, I have a question 
specifically for you as a translator. Often translators are hidden by the name 
of the author and, consequently, don’t receive the credit they are due. In 
other words, translation work remains underappreciated. Is there anything 
you wish scholars would be more aware of with regard to translation? 
 
MELISSA MCMAHON: Ironically, the more prominent the name of a 
translator is on a work—as is customary in literary and scholarly 
translation—the less likely it is that they were paid very much. Literary and 
scholarly translation largely draws on a pool of volunteer or semi-volunteer 
translators in the student and academic body, who do the work because it is 
connected to their interests and a good point of entry into the academic 
community—this was my situation in any case. Many excellent translations 
emerge from this system, but some will inevitably be amateurish because the 
translator is an amateur. So I suppose I would like there to be more 
awareness of the positive difference a professional can make to the finished 
work and hence the benefit of allocating resources to that—but then I would 
say that, wouldn’t I. The academics I have worked with have always been 
aware of this issue and have been very concerned to be as generous as 
possible, but they are limited by the system. 
 
BRIEN KARAS: As a translator, what concerns do have about making 
Bergsonism accessible? To what extent do you strive to make it speak to 
twenty-first century dispositions? 
 
MELISSA MCMAHON: I always strive to produce a translation that is as 
natural and readable as possible while recognizing the fact that there are 
French sensibilities and stylistic peculiarities that simply can’t and shouldn’t 
be erased. Sometimes amateur or inexperienced translators can tend towards 
transliteration, whether because they are overly deferential to the author, or 
not confident or familiar enough with the source language outside of the 
academic sphere. This can have an impact on the accessibility and appeal of 
a work. An interesting question regarding older texts is whether you should 
be mindful of English language norms of the time the text was written, or 
whether you should be able to draw on more contemporary language in the 
name of naturalness. I think perhaps that as long as you are aware of the 
effect the period has on the meaning of the words for the author, it is okay to 
use the language of your own time in the translation, but it’s not a situation I 
have a lot of experience with. 
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MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: How has the secondary literature on 
Bergson impacted your understanding of Bergson? 
 
MELISSA MCMAHON: This is my Deleuzianism kicking in, but I think 
secondly literature mostly provides an insight into the author of the 
secondary literature rather than the primary text. Secondary literature is 
more about what you can do with a thinker than the thinker themselves. 
Translating Jankélévitch on Bergson gave me insights into Jankélévitch, 
rather than Bergson, which is no criticism of Jankélévitch. The exception 
would be works like Philippe Soulez’s Bergson politique, which examines the 
political and historical context of Bergson’s writing (I translated a section of 
the book for the Lefebvre and White collection), and that kind of insight into 
the polemics around at the time an author is writing, whether historical or 
philosophical, is often very illuminating, because they are often not 
explicitly mentioned in the work. 
 
BRIEN KARAS: Often we come to one theorist through reading another. 
Melissa just mentioned the tension that can arise between, for example, 
reading Bergson avec Deleuze and coming to Bergson from, say, his 
nineteenth century predecessors. How do you understand the relation 
between Bergson and post-structuralism? Positivism? Phenomenology? 
Analytic philosophy? 
 
MELISSA MCMAHON: I think the relationship between Bergson and post-
structuralism in concrete terms is Deleuze. My view might be skewed by my 
own experience, but I get the impression that it was Deleuze’s interest in 
Bergson that brought him to the general attention of poststructuralists, 
whether the latter were Deleuzean or not. Maybe it spread because 
Bergson’s philosophy seemed to tie in with contemporary phenomenological 
interests in time, consciousness and criticism of the natural sciences. I don’t 
see Bergson however as belonging to the same lineage as phenomenology, 
either philosophically or historically. Bergson’s work was contemporary 
with the twin birth of phenomenology and analytic philosophy or logical 
positivism, but he seems to exist to one side of them. Analytic philosophers 
at the time such as Russell grouped him with Anglo-American “anti-
intellectualist” movements such as pragmatism. That categorization still 
seems true to me. 
 
FRÉDÉRIC WORMS: Here’s a thought about how various trends in 
philosophy (and psychology) in France changed the reception of his work 
during this interval. There have been several distinctive moments in French 
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philosophy, each of which centered around a new philosophical problem. 
But it is a fact that the very reception of Bergson, during the century, is a 
living proof for such distinctive moments. Of course there is the parricide of 
breaking with and from Bergson. Although Husserl, Freud, and even 
Heidegger were Bergson’s contemporaries, they were used by Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty, but also Politzer, Lacan, Ricoeur and Bachelard, to depart 
from Bergson. Bergson would then be seen as committing the unforgivable 
sin of “realism,” that is, thinking of consciousness, according to them, as a 
“thing” and not as an act, or even a “nothingness,” a pure freedom. But 
Bergson was also accused of being a-historical and a-dialectical in his 
thinking. Of course, Bergson’s concepts of life and time are both polarized, 
including some negativity (culminating in the two ethics and politics). 
Bergson’s durée was thought to be too subjective, and lacking objectivity, as 
Canguilhem, Jankélévitch, Wahl, and even Levinas well knew. But nothing 
would do. Then came structuralism, where Bergson lead a sort of hidden 
life; that of the pure Deleuzean difference in the structural sign system and 
world; or that of the Derridean continually differing un-presentable time; or 
paradoxically in the vindication against him (as Russell invented analytic 
philosophy using Bergson’s critique of analysis) of space in Foucault, Lacan, 
or Levi-Strauss. Invisible threads were still persisting. Then the questions of 
the brain and memory, of life and death, of creation and destruction, came 
back to us, and Bergson, and all the hidden tradition of critical vitalism, with 
him. Recently, there’s been some focus on Bergson and art, particularly 
modernist art, which Mullarkey has shed light on.  
 
BRIEN KARAS: Today, we’re also starting to see a new turn to Bergson’s 
political thought. I’m thinking here of Lefebvre and White’s Bergson, Politics 
and Religion and Beyond Bergson: Race, Gender, and Colonialism, edited by 
Mark and Andrea Pitts. 
 
SUZANNE GUERLAC: Of course the response to this question depends on 
what one means by post-structuralism. If one defines it in terms of writing—
Derridean grammatology or Barthesian textuality—there might not appear 
to be much common ground. Yet Bergson’s thinking is fundamentally 
deconstructive in that he critiques the whole history of western metaphysics 
for having suppressed the dynamic force of time. He diagnoses in it an 
“obsession with space” and affirms the limits of both abstract conceptual 
thought and quantification, which he characterizes as modes of 
spatialization. His philosophy of duration includes a critique of presence; 
“nothing is less than the present,” he writes; the only thing that remains 
constant is change. So both Bergson and Derrida engage in a rigorous 
critique of the metaphysics of presence.  
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 Bergson also challenges epistemological assumptions. In Creative 
Evolution, he presents human intelligence as an effect, or product, of 
evolution, rather than positioning it in relation to a transcendental subject, 
which would know evolution, nature or the real from the outside. In his 
analysis of the “cinematographic illusion,” the cinematographic becomes a 
powerful critical figure of false epistemology and false metaphysics that has 
run throughout the history of western philosophy. He derives the cinematic 
figure from Jules Marey’s claims that chronophotography captures motion—
the motion of life itself—and the fulfillment of the illusion of this capture by 
the mechanisms of projection invented by the Lumière Brothers. He 
proposes a second figure to help us understand the critical force of the 
cinematographic figure: the child’s puzzle. The child puts together pieces of 
a puzzle with full knowledge of what the resulting image of the whole will 
be. The cinematic illusion gives only an illusion of dynamism; it is 
constructed out of a concatenation of fixed or spatialized elements.  
 We could say that both Bergson and Derrida are philosophers of 
difference. Whereas Derrida relies on the linguistic figure of 
grammatological difference (or indefinite chains of mediation and deferral) 
to challenge metaphysical notions of presence and conceptual 
representation, Bergson appeals to direct experience to convey the processes 
of a dynamic heterogeneous real that we limit and arrest through 
representation. Post-structuralism will of course reject any notion of 
immediate experience. The issue here is how one understands what Bergson 
means by “immediate experience”—it may not coincide precisely with what 
post-structuralism rejects.  
 As philosophers, both Bergson and Derrida face the problem of trying 
to say in words precisely what escapes language or cannot be named by it—
différance in the case of Derrida and real duration in the case of Bergson. Both 
philosophers must cultivate specific writing strategies to perform a thinking 
that is incompatible with representation. This is of course an old problem, 
one that goes back to German Romanticism and that we find in Nietzsche 
and late Heidegger, as well as in the late work of Merleau-Ponty. 
 
PAULINA OCHOA ESPEJO: We probably owe Bergson’s come-back in the 
twenty-first century to Deleuze’s Bergsonism (and I think Deleuze’s reading 
of Bergson was much needed, particularly in political theory where, from 
the 1950s until Deleuze published, most references to Bergson were 
immediately followed by denunciations of his “vitalism” and strained 
associations between his philosophy and Nazism.) However, that post-
structuralists have gotten a lot out of him now does not mean that thinkers 
in other schools have not; it is clear that Bergson shared many key 
commitments with the other traditions that you list, including positivism 
and analytic philosophy.  
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 In my view, one of the most distinctive traits of Bergson’s philosophy 
is a particular method. Bergson had a particular style of dealing with 
intellectual problems, which he shares with many phenomenologists and 
analytical philosophers. Like them, Bergson seeks to solve or “dissolve” 
problems. He analyzes paradoxes by clarifying their terms, either logically 
(like analytical philosophers) or by studying the structure of experience (like 
phenomenologists), and then he shows that these seemingly intractable 
paradoxes are in fact false problems. He develops this method in Time and 
Free Will and uses it in all his subsequent works. In contrast, most post-
structuralist thinkers “press” problems. That is, they examine problems in 
order to find difficulties and paradoxes, and then show that these paradoxes 
present a philosophical impasse—that they are problems that we cannot 
solve or dissolve. (I talk more about this in a piece I wrote with Thomas 
Donahue: “The Analytical-Continental Divide: Styles of Dealing with 
Problems in Political Theory.”) 
 
STEPHEN CROCKER: Bergsonism gives us a sense of “wholism” and 
multidimensionality that stands in contrast to the themes of fragmented 
perception and distracted consciousness that have dominated post-
structuralist cultural theory in recent years. In the 1980s and 1990s, it was 
popular to describe the cultural development of the post-war world as a 
progressive “flattening of experience.” Critiques of the essentialist and 
totalizing discourses of structuralism and Marxism often led to a whole new 
valorization of ideas of dispersion and fragmentation. In the absence of any 
full and whole experience, the world seems to consist of isolated, 
decontextualized signs. 
 The flat, depthlessness of late modernity was the central thesis of some 
of the most influential works of cultural theory in the late twentieth century, 
most notably Jean Baudrillard’s Simulations, Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The 
Postmodern Condition, and Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism, or the Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism. Lyotard describes the decline of Enlightenment 
Grand Narratives as a flattening of knowledge: “The speculative hierarchy 
of learning gives way to an immanent and, as it were, flat network of areas 
of inquiry.” As daily life is speeded up and plugged into ever wider global 
circuits of information and exchange, it becomes more difficult to recognize 
any pattern in the randomness of events. Jameson famously captures this 
position with his thesis that late capitalism produces a schizophrenic 
consciousness of disconnected sensations. 
 Bergson's relation to the science of early modernity was not to reject it, 
but to carry through the project that its atomism began, but did not 
complete. Bergson’s critique of scientific modernity helps us recognize the 
dualism of unity and fragmentation, or the one and the many, that underlay 
these more recent debates. The postmodern thesis that we had moved from a 
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unified to a fragmented world raises a problem very similar to the one that 
Bergson recognized in his critique of mechanical science. In the haste to 
overcome totalizing images of structure, post-structuralism risked falling 
back on the principle of completion and self-containedness that it hoped to 
overcome. Its many tiny unities of subject positions and identity fragments 
still require some kind of “whole” or medium in which to operate. Bergson’s 
critique of science therefore raises important and interesting questions about 
the limits of the poststructuralist discourse of fragmentation.  
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Bachir, in African Art as Philosophy: 
Senghor, Bergson, and the Idea of Negritude, you begin with the claim that 
“Bergson teaches us how to read philosophers.” What do you mean by this? 
Are you speaking about the philosophers that Bergson inherited as part of 
his tradition and/or the philosophers that come after and are influenced by 
him? Perhaps you could connect this with some of the things about art that 
Charlotte mentioned earlier. 
 
SOULEYMANE BACHIR DIAGNE: When I say that Bergson teaches us how 
to read philosophers and how to read Senghor in particular, I am making a 
reference to his statement that great philosophical works are born out of one 
original intuition, which they develop in many different directions. To read 
them is to get to that point where their thought is condensed and from 
which it unfolds. This is particularly true, I contend, of Senghor whose 
fundamental intuition is that African art is the language of African 
philosophy and is knowledge. Senghor had that intuition from his frequent 
visits to the museum of Place Trocadéro in Paris when he was a student at 
Lycée Louis-le Grand. What Senghor had to say afterwards about 
negritude—negritude as ontology, as epistemology, as aesthetics of course, 
and even as politics—is to be read as a development of that fundamental 
notion that art is knowledge, a view he developed in conversation with the 
philosophy of Nietzsche, with the art of Picasso, but essentially with 
Bergson’s thought. His friend and accomplice Aimé Césaire has a reflection 
on “poetry and knowledge” which is deeply Bergsonian. Generally 
speaking, Senghor and Césaire and those who constituted their thought in 
conversation with them found in Bergson the formulation of the notion that 
the truth of art is to manifest that detachment from reality (Bergson speaks 
of the “distraction” of the artist) makes us see more in it. We see reality 
better and more and otherwise through art. We know better because the 
work of art teaches us that an expansion of our capacity to perceive is 
possible so that we can know the real. 
Senghor expresses Bergson’s distinction between the analytical, 
scientific, approach of things and the intuitive grasping of reality by coining 
the expressions “eye-reason” for the knowledge that keeps its object at a 
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distance, immobilizes it, and “embrace-reason” for the kind of artistic 
knowledge which means coinciding with the object, being in phase with it, 
with its rhythm. 
So Bergson’s philosophy of intuition and of élan vital have been 
incorporated in the language of Senghor and Césaire. And the 
rapprochement was also made with certain thoughts about time expressed 
in certain African narratives, manifesting other dimensions of time than 
serial, quantifiable time. Senghor has often declared that the twentieth 
century, putting an end to the age of positivism, had truly started with the 
“1889 revolution,” meaning with the publication of Bergson’s Essai sur les 
données immédiates de la conscience. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Stephen, earlier you mentioned 
media. Explain how you understand Bergson’s influence in Media Studies, 
particularly in relation to some interlocutors, for example, Benjamin, 
Deleuze, McLuhan, and Serres. For instance, their many differences aside, 
Deleuze and McLuhan share the view that mechanical thought does not (or 
does not only) alienate us from what is real, but raises important problems 
about the nature of relations and intervals. Both develop a very unusual sort 
of media studies that is not interested in the semiotic meaning of the 
message conveyed, or the political economy of its production, but rather in 
the nature of mediation as such.  
 
STEPHEN CROCKER: Agamben suggests that the philosophical element of 
a work is its capacity for elaboration. Our interest in the ideas of another 
concern are not only their truth content, or how well they reflect the reality 
they describe, but what can be done with them. In what new direction can 
an idea be pushed? With what can it be mixed? What new realities can it 
help illuminate? In my book, Bergson and the Metaphysics of Media, I pick up 
on some central elements of Bergson’s “science” of intervals, and show how 
they have been mixed in with various degrees of Catholicism, Marxism, 
phenomenology, and structuralism to elaborate a metaphysically oriented 
media studies. Bergson’s philosophy of discrete and continuous 
multiplicities, for example, informs the intervallic studies of Deleuze, 
McLuhan, and Serres.  
 Using Bergsonian ideas, Deleuze and McLuhan see the emergence of 
film, in particular, as a pivotal point or “break boundary” between the 
mechanical, discrete structures of early modernity, and the continuous 
organic forms of organization that now become thinkable as the mechanical 
world breaks up. In their very different kinds of media studies, we can trace 
the elaboration of Bergson’s opposition of discrete and continuous 
organization into a theory of media and relations.  
M a r k  W i l l i a m  W e s t m o r e l a n d  a n d  B r i e n  K a r a s ,  e d s .  |  2 4 5  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.778 
 In Creative Evolution Bergson shows how a medium is a necessary 
means to convey change, but because it can be speeded up and made more 
efficient, we also experience it as obstacle in the way of a more effective 
delivery of a message. This contradiction—where the medium of change is 
both a means and an obstacle—leads to important metaphysical questions 
about the nature of middles and media. What must mediation be if it does 
not go away? Why is there always a middle? Can the means be considered 
independently of the content that passes through them?  
 Serres’ work on “noise” takes this seemingly contradictory quality of 
the medium (as means and obstacle) in new and interesting directions. 
Noise, as Serres informs us, is not itself a medium but always indicates the 
presence of one. Communication requires, at the very least, the presence of 
two different stations and a means of moving between them. The message 
has to move thorough a middle, and each middle, it turns out, has its own 
distinct properties that affect the message in precise ways. The medium is 
not only a conduit but also a “space of transformation” where something 
happens to the message. The point here is not to make Serres a Bergsonian, 
though he himself has made that claim, but to show how his work 
contributes to, or elaborates the complimentary science of intervals and 
clarifies the relations among mechanism, medium and multiplicity.  
 
JIMENA CANALES: Just how important Bergson is for media studies has 
not yet been fully fleshed out. Like Stephen said, media is still usually 
considered in terms of communication theory (transmission, noise, 
distortion) or in terms of a McLuhanesque “everything is media” slogan. But 
for me, the realization that Bergson had a better alternative for 
understanding media came during my research for A Tenth of a Second: A 
History. It was then that I realized how useful his work could be for Science 
and Technology Studies (STS). Bergson inspires us to ask how it is that 
media becomes and to see that its becoming is tied to our experience of 
temporality. He offers a new way of understanding technology by reference 
to time. In his assessment of time dilation in relativity theory he explained it 
clearly: “It is not because clocks go more slowly that time has lengthened; it 
is because time has lengthened that clocks, remaining as they are, are found 
to run more slowly.” 
 Two points about his comments on the cinematographic method are 
key to understand this aspect of his work. First of all, what his says about 
the cinematographical method applies simultaneously to a new technology 
and to our intellects. Bergson criticized the instrument as much as the 
proclivity of the human mind for arranging temporal images spatially, he 
criticized its restrictiveness and urged scientists to “set the 
cinematographical method aside” and search instead for a “second kind of 
knowledge.” So with him we already have the challenge of thinking about 
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technology, minds, and selves in intertwined ways. Usually we trace this 
lesson to Heidegger (“The Question Concerning Technology”), Simondon 
(Du mode d'existence des objets techniques), or Haraway (Cyborg Manifesto), but 
this point was already eloquently made by Bergson much earlier.  
 Second, media becomes because of how it is attached to a certain 
conception of movement, change and therefore time. When he wrote about 
cinematography, he was not only careful to point out its illusions, he also 
explained why the illusions worked so well: “In order that the pictures may 
be animated, there must be movement somewhere. The movement does 
indeed exist here; it is in the apparatus.” The cinematographic spectacle only 
worked because viewers were not looking at the apparatus that hid real 
movement. I’ve taken this insight of Bergson as an invitation to pay careful 
attention and understand what it is that makes technology work more 
broadly. Often, it is something that is kept from sight. In the case of cinema, 
it is all that is hidden in the dark area behind the spectators, and in the case 
of other technologies it can include hidden networks and people (a car needs 
a road, a mechanic, and a motor and chassis with steel that comes from 
mining, etc.). All of these additional elements (human and non-human) have 
particular relations to time. In the case of cinema, it appears most obviously 
in the clockwork mechanism that drives it, but other elements involve 
activities of “waiting” and “servicing” that make technology work.  
 It is no surprise that Heidegger expands this aspect of Bergson’s work 
in his assessment of scientific instruments and scientific measurement. For 
scientists, the power of measurement is often traced back to a famous quote 
by William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin): “When you can measure what you 
are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about 
it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, 
your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.” But an excessive 
focus on measurement results comes at the expense of exploring the 
conditions of possibility of measurability. What is even more interesting 
(and this is what we learn from Heidegger) is that the very possibility of 
measurement presupposes a notion of fixity that arises from a severance or 
separation from the rest of time. “Measuring time is essentially such that it is 
necessary to say ‘now,’” explained Heidegger, “but in obtaining the 
measurement, we, as it were, forget what has been measured as such, so that 
nothing is to be found except a number and a stretch.” While in Bergson’s 
account it is the working cinematographic apparatus that hides time, in 
Heidegger it is every scientific measurement that already does that to some 
extent. 
 
BRIEN KARAS: In what sense can Bergson be seen as part of the tradition of 
rationalism? There are those that refuse such an interpretation and assert 
that, in fact, Bergson’s thought should be considered a form of irrationalism. 
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In contrast, there are those that assert that Bergson is most certainly to be 
placed in the Cartesian tradition of first philosophy, albeit with a radically 
different starting point. Is either view adequate?  
 
FRÉDÉRIC WORMS: As Péguy said when writing on Bergson: every 
philosophy is a kind of rationalism because philosophy as such is an effort to 
enlarge reason not only to what is adapted but also to what offers resistance 
to it. Bergson is by all means a conceptual thinker: he distinguishes, he 
defines, he argues. You can disagree, but you cannot discard him just 
because he developed a concept of intuition and a definition of what cannot 
be defined. People have been deceived by the content of his rationalism, 
forgetting the acts of reason that are behind it and beyond it. There are some 
irrationalist defenses of reason (such is the case of Benda’s according to 
Péguy), but there are some rationalist thoughts of what resists reason, and of 
course such is the case of Bergson, as Canguilhem well knew, who himself 
was rightly called a “vital rationalist.”  
 
BRIEN KARAS: Perhaps for the remainder of our time, we can briefly talk 
about some of Bergson’s major concepts, or perhaps some of the 
implications of those concepts. For instance, the concept of intuition has 
come up a few times in our conversation.  
 
FRÉDÉRIC WORMS: I am actually working on an article on Bergson and 
Lucretius right now! There is nothing that Bergson takes from Lucretius, 
except one idea, perhaps one intuition, namely, the very idea that a 
philosophy is always based on an intuition. His commentary is founded on 
the idea that the entirety of Lucretius’ poem is grounded on a single 
intuition. Even emotion is a great pity for humankind arising from its 
unknowing the true substance of atomic reality, and of the fixed laws of 
nature. Of course, Bergson does not believe in the same conception of 
nature. His metaphysics will be opposed to every tenet of Lucretius’s, but he 
will always hold, as in his youth, that one and only l’intuition philosophique. 
Is there an emotion full of knowledge? Is this more fundamental than a pure, 
abstract statement? Bergson had been accused by Russell of being a poet; but 
his remarkable study of Lucretius shows that a creative intuition can and 
must create both ideas and style. Perhaps these poets—Lucretius and 
Bergson—are closer to first philosophy than Russell ever knew. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Senghor’s oft-misunderstood dictum 
that emotion is negro as reason is Greek seems to map on to Bergson’s 
distinction between intuition and intellect. In what sense should emotion 
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and intuition be privileged over reason and intellect? Or, is this an unfair 
way of framing what’s at stake? 
 
SOULEYMANE BACHIR DIAGNE: Senghor allowed himself to be 
misunderstood when he wrote in one of his early writings in prose that 
emotion is negro as reason is Greek: he obviously let his will to coin a 
flashing formula (in French it is an alexandrine) carry him into writing a 
statement that was understood more as a validation of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s 
characterization of primitive pre-logical mentality than the Bergsonian 
distinction between intuition and intellect that it deeply was.  
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: African intuition ought to be 
valorized since intuition, not intellect, is the means for grasping the 
heterogeneous continuity of reality. Clevis Headley has recently explored 
this dictum in “Bergson, Senghor, and the Philosophical Foundations of 
Négritude: Intellect, Intuition, and Knowledge” in Beyond Bergson. Headley 
suggests that your thesis is correct, namely, that the primary emphasis is on 
the analogy and less about epistemology or cognitive ability. 
 
SOULEYMANE BACHIR DIAGNE: The context of the article in which the 
dictum is to be found and the reflections on African aesthetics developed in 
it show that the formula should be understood as an analogy: the works of 
Greco-Roman statuary are to eye-reason what the works of African 
sculpture are to embrace-reason. Afterwards Senghor spent much ink and 
energy explaining that all humans share the same cognitive capacities of 
course. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Many would choose durée as 
Bergson’s most noteworthy concept. Can this concept be captured in visual 
art? How can we think temporality within a painting? Does something like 
Duchamp’s “Nude Descending a Staircase (No.2)” accomplish this? 
 
CHARLOTTE DE MILLE: Absolutely. It is a mistake to think of static art 
objects existing in a solely spatial realm, not least as we perceive them in 
time. At the start of the twentieth century many avant-garde artists 
experimented with depictions of temporality, as Mark Antliff in particular 
has demonstrated so clearly. However, this was also one of the most 
contested areas between different factions: Wyndham Lewis for example 
accused the Futurists of fixing a series of instants rather than representing 
durée in process, presumably thinking of works such as Giacomo Balla’s The 
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Hand of the Violinist—and he’d probably have said much the same about 
Nude Descending a Staircase. Looking at a work such as Umberto Boccioni’s 
Unique Forms of Continuity in Space or his series States of Mind: The Farewells; 
Those who Go; Those Who Stay, we see a far more engaged and complex 
response to Bergsonian thought, not only the dynamism and movement of 
temporal experience, but also its intangible traces in memory. 
 
BRIEN KARAS: Jimena and Suzanne, do either of you have reflections on 
Bergson’s theory of temporality, which Stephen mentioned earlier? 
 
JIMENA CANALES: For me the key sentence is again from Duration and 
Simultaneity: “Time is for me that which is most real and necessary; it is the 
necessary condition of action: What am I saying? It is action itself.” It 
matches with how Bergson spoke about time elsewhere, for example in the 
quote Mark cited earlier: “Men do not sufficiently realize that their future is 
in their own hands.” In terms of science, we might say that Bergson’s 
contribution was to consider time as an operator instead of merely as a 
parameter.  
 This positive (and science-friendly) aspect of Bergson’s temporality 
frequently gets lost when his contributions are seen as merely 
“psychological” and as a response to the common (Aristotelian) 
identification of time with space. Bergson stressed the difference of his 
notion of temporality so much by contrasting it against the ways in which it 
was defined objectively via space that his contributions were often seen as 
merely negative. So Einstein seems to have read him in this way when he 
wrote in his journal: “The philosophers constantly dance around the 
dichotomy: the psychologically real and physically real, and differ only in 
evaluations in this regard. Either the former appears as a ‘mere individual 
experience’ or the second as ‘mere construct of thought.’ Bergson belongs to 
the latter kind but objectifies in his way without noticing.” Heidegger, in 
Being and Time, also considered him as merely inverting a dominant notion 
of time. He explained quite clearly what his ax against the philosopher was: 
“Every subsequent account of time, including Bergson’s, has been essentially 
determined by [Aristotle’s concept].” The contrast to space was so prevalent 
that it reinforced a cliché where Bergsonism, in philosophy and French 
culture more generally (from philosophers to film directors), was seen as 
excessively fixated on flows, continuity, ripples, and other water and liquid 
metaphors.  
 In light of this common way of reading Bergson we may understand—
and celebrate—Bachelard for stressing the poetics of space as much as those 
of time. To do this required breaking away from the common identification 
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of Bergson with the continuous. “From Bergsonism we accept almost all, 
except continuity,” he wrote. 
 For me, the Bergson-to-Bachelard contribution to thinking about time 
allows us to conceive it in ways that go beyond the sciences-humanities 
dichotomies or subjective-objective stereotypes. Time can also be considered 
in decisively post-Augustinian and post-Kantian ways. For example, it can 
be seen as most akin to sowing or even writing. Drawing lines—making 
furrows on various surfaces (on page, on a road, or on fertile ground for an 
agricultural plough)—is not so different from dividing marks and ticks of a 
clock. In this way, the essential instrument for time-keeping, the clock, can 
also be seen as a tool for the creation of culture. Rituals of caring, sharing, 
and giving can thus be reintegrated into our scientific and instrumental 
understanding of temporality.  
 
BRIEN KARAS: Suzanne, can you shed light on the different notions of 
temporality operative in Bergson’s oeuvre, particularly between Time and 
Free Will and Creative Evolution? Deleuze claims that a radical break occurs 
between these two texts with regard to Bergson’s treatment of temporality. 
He reads Time and Free Will as a philosophy of consciousness (a 
phenomenology). He claims that Bergson breaks with this psychological 
perspective and shifts to an ontological one in Creative Evolution. For him 
these two approaches are radically discontinuous because, in the context of 
post-structuralism, the philosophy of difference (and the impact of 
psychoanalysis) radically undermined the status of the subject. 
 
SUZANNE GUERLAC: Bergson is a strategic thinker who enters into 
specific debates. He challenges Fechner, Taine, and associationist 
psychologists in Time and Free Will and Spencer in Creative Evolution. He is a 
transversal thinker, not a systematic one. He neither systematically 
continues the theory of time as duration presented in Time and Free Will nor 
abandons it entirely when he shifts to the new project of Creative Evolution.  
 In Time and Free Will Bergson distinguishes duration from abstract 
(Kantian) time as lived time, which he characterizes in qualitative, dynamic, 
nuanced, and heterogeneous terms. What duration means, however, 
fundamentally, is that the past survives and acts on the future. This is the 
sense in which consciousness comes into play, for memory lets the past 
survive in present action (see the analysis of attentive recognition in Matter 
and Memory). In Creative Evolution Bergson extends the reach of duration out 
from the framework of individual experience to “the totality of the material 
universe” which itself enjoys a kind of agency. “The universe endures,” he 
writes, “the more we deepen the nature of time, the more we understand 
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that duration signifies invention, creation of forms, the continuous 
elaboration of the absolutely new.” 
 There is no fundamental disparity between Bergson’s early discussion 
of duration in Time and Free Will and the one he presents in Creative Evolution 
in the context of what he calls his “philosophy of life”—“continuity of 
change, conservation of the past in the present, real duration [la durée vraie] 
the living being seems to share these attributes with consciousness.” And he 
asks, “Can one go further and say that life is invention like conscious 
activity, ceaseless creation as it is?” The basis for this analogy is the 
inscription of time such that the past acts upon the (arriving) present. The 
“evolution of the living being,” he writes in Creative Evolution, “implies a 
continuous registering [enregistrement] of duration, a persistence of the past 
in the present and therefore at least an appearance of organic memory [une 
apparence au moins de mémoire organique].” 
 There is no fundamental discontinuity in Bergson’s treatment of 
temporality when duration becomes, as Deleuze puts it, ontological. There is 
rather an extension or deepening of duration which becomes both “the 
foundation of our being” and “the very substance of the things with which 
we are in communication.” The fundamental features of real duration 
remain coherent: the past (time) presses against the present “and produces 
[en fait jaillir] a new form incommensurable with its antecedents.” What 
remains constant is the distinction between what Bergson calls “concrete 
time” (or duration) “along which a real system develops” and abstract time 
“which intervenes in our speculations about artificial systems.” The critique 
of mechanistic and teleological versions of evolution in the later work 
parallels the critique of abstract thought (the work of intelligence) in Time 
and Free Will; in both cases the problem is the eradication of the force of time 
(or of time as force): “We don’t think real time” he writes in Creative 
Evolution “but we live it, because life exceeds intelligence.”  
 
BRIEN KARAS: What is your view of the narrative expressed by thinkers as 
diverse as Adorno and Deleuze that Matter and Memory represents Bergson 
at his most radical, with works such as Creative Evolution representing a step 
back from this radicalism? 
 
FRÉDÉRIC WORMS: I used to agree; I do not any more. Let me explain. 
First, let us not be confused: people are fascinated, in fact, not by Matter and 
Memory as a whole (as is obviously and explicitly the case with Deleuze, but 
also phenomenologists such as Barbaras, and between them in the great 
book by Bento Prado Jr.), but by the first chapter of Matter and Memory! It is 
understandable. It presents itself as a “pure description” of “pure 
perception,” in terms of images and what Deleuze would call (and Prado 
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and Barbaras after him) a pure “transcendental field.” All very good. Except 
for one major point, and that is the obvious fact that this “pure” perception 
is not the “real” perception, but what perception would be in the pure 
instant of pure space and without the concrete role of time in perception, 
which memory adds to it (which is what we get in chapters 2 and 3) and 
which will be described in the fourth and last chapter on matter as duration, 
and perception as life and creation. What a mistake. And that is also a way 
to forget that Matter and Memory leads to and in a way calls for Creative 
evolution. The latter is much more radical since the spatial perceptions and 
perspectives are there engendered and derived from pure time and creation, 
and their reversal is due to their interruption and internal negativity. To be 
honest, it took me a while to go through this whole process again. In other 
words, I needed to read Bergson’s oeuvre over and over to see this clearly. 
But then one could see the result with certainty: every book by Bergson is as 
radical as the preceding. Each one grabs hold of the roots of even more 
demanding philosophical questions.  
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Let’s return to some of the political 
dimensions of Bergson’s philosophy, say, for example, democracy. 
 
MICHAEL FOLEY: Bergson argued that the beliefs we revere as eternal 
truths eventually were in fact contingent creations. So democracy is not the 
natural and inevitable terminus of civilization but an idea that had to be 
invented and need not have been. It was based on the notion of the equality 
of all, which was not a discovery of the Enlightenment, as is often claimed, 
but a radical proposition of Christianity. Philosophers had never formulated 
any such idea and might never have. We have Christianity to thank for 
secularism. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Secularism from Christianity. I’m 
thinking here of Schmitt and later reactions to his thesis that modern 
political theory is redressed theology. How might Bergson’s philosophy 
contribute to political theology? There are different ways of thinking of 
political theology. For example, “political theology” can mean the 
subordination of religious to political authority: what Max Weber termed 
“caesaropapism.” The term has also been used to describe the theological 
reflection on political problems and doctrines such as liberation theology or 
Islamist thought. I don’t think Bergson is so illuminating when thinking 
about political theology according to this definition, but he is extremely 
useful if we think about political theology in the way that many 
contemporary political theorists use the term. 
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PAULINA OCHOA ESPEJO: According to this other usage, political 
theology is the thesis that the liberal democratic state cannot justify state 
coercion successfully in its own terms, because it must rely on normative 
standards that cannot be explained scientifically or according to any 
convention that every single member of society would accept. So, any 
argument that tries to justify state coercion will eventually appeal to some 
controversial metaphysical assumption. This assumption need not be 
explicitly religious, but insofar as it is part of a general account of the nature 
of reality it will be functionally equivalent to theology in the context of a 
justification of the state. Thus, according to the thesis of political theology, 
these metaphysical assumptions perform the same legitimizing function that 
theology performed in the past, when religious beliefs justified authority. 
Many people worry about this type of political theology because they think 
that a justification of politics that appeals to metaphysics must necessarily be 
dogmatic or violent. But this is not necessarily the case.  
 Schmitt believed that liberal democracy required a functional 
substitute for religious justification, because without an authoritative will, 
anarchism would exploit the weakness of liberal doctrine and eventually 
destroy the state. But this belief relies on Schmitt’s picture of a secularized 
sovereign will, which in turn comes from a distinctive theology of 
voluntarism which can be traced back to Hobbes and his contemporaries. 
Schmitt’s view of political theology reduces political order to the dictates of 
a commanding will. In contrast, Bergson’s view of divinity and religion, as 
propounded in The Two Sources and Creative Evolution, also focuses on 
motivating the will, but this type of motivation couldn’t be more different. 
Where Schmitt sees the commands of a sovereign modeled on the 
Pantocrator (an Almighty God enthroned as emperor: omniscient, 
changeless, and all-foreknowing); Bergson sees the divine as love or creative 
energy, the condition of possibility for novelty and change. Unlike Schmitt’s 
political theology, which seeks established order and stability at any cost, 
Bergson’s view of divinity allows for expansion, and it opens new 
possibilities for the ideals of liberal democracy to grow, even while 
acknowledging their limitations. 
 
BRIEN KARAS: Paulina, in “Creative Freedom: Henri Bergson and 
Democratic Theory,” you connect Bergson with democratic theory, which 
you just mentioned. Bergson wrote about liberal democracy in the few pages 
that he devoted exclusively to politics in The Two Sources. So for those who 
seek to draw the political implications of Bergson’s philosophy, democratic 
theory is an obvious place to look. Yet current interpreters of Bergson in 
political theory usually focus on his metaphysics—they seldom discuss 
democracy—while most contemporary democratic theorists could hardly be 
less interested in Bergson’s insights. Can you explain your thesis? 
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PAULINA OCHOA ESPEJO: In the essay you mention, I probe the areas of 
overlap between Bergson’s philosophy and current democratic theory. 
Specifically, I focus on “the problem of the people,” a problem that is also 
known as “the democratic paradox” and “the boundary problem.” This is a 
problem of self-reference that arises because the demos seems to be both 
precondition and product of the democratic process. This problem bedevils 
debates on cosmopolitanism, the possibility of democracy without a state, 
the criteria for exclusion from the demos, and in general, every time there is a 
tension between concrete peoples and the universal democratic ideals of 
freedom and equality. The problem is important because it seems to show 
that a liberal democratic people is a chimera. The problem of the people is 
thus taken by many critics of liberal democracy to evince inherent flaws in 
any political project based simultaneously on a people and on the ideals of 
universal human freedom and equality. As plausible as this critique may 
seem, it in fact jumps too hastily to its conclusions.  
 Bergson’s philosophy can help us dissolve the problem of the people, 
and thus give us new traction on all of these debates. I argue that Bergson’s 
social and political thought can provide a solution to the problem of the 
people by modifying democratic principles and concepts at the root, that is, 
at the metaphysical level. Bergson’s main insight in The Two Sources, (that is, 
the very distinction between the sources), allows us to see that this is a false 
problem, and thus avoid the grim conclusions of the critics. I use Bergson’s 
insight to argue that the democratic people is not absurd—provided that we 
see it as an ongoing process, rather than as a fully formed entity. Seen as a 
process, the people is always evolving under the aegis of a self-creative 
drive derived from the lived experience of time and the indeterminacy of 
nature, a drive I call “creative freedom.” This conception of the people can 
dissolve the problem of self-reference (where the people is both its own 
cause and its consequence) because it is always partial and incomplete, a 
part of it creating other parts as the process changes. This processual 
conception of the people can justify democracy without appeal to a narrow 
conception of popular sovereignty based on the rational social contract. It 
can also provide a ground for democratic theory that acknowledges the 
merits in the views of the critics of liberal democracy, but is yet able to 
defend that ideology.  
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: The United States faces a major 
injustice on its southern border (and also more recently, the failure to accept 
refugees from Syria) whereby the migrant has become seen as a criminal 
threat. Do you think that Bergson’s discussion of the open and closed 
societies can help us in our thinking about borders? How might the figure of 
the migrant be akin to the figure of the mystic in The Two Sources? 
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SOULEYMANE BACHIR DIAGNE: Bergson warned us against the danger 
of turning the open society into a closed one. We can see in the rise, in many 
different places, of populisms and nationalisms as well as the return, in the 
public square, of xenophobic discourses of another time, that the open 
society is always under the threat of internal forces of closure. Hospitality to 
difference, ethnic or religious, is not a threat to the open society, it is a test of 
its openness. 
 
PAULINA OCHOA ESPEJO: It is tempting to use Bergson’s ideas of open 
and closed societies to think about states with open and closed borders. If 
we were to use the ideas of open and closed societies as a simple model, we 
could see those who are suspicious of immigrants as promoting a closed 
society, while those who believe in open borders and human rights could be 
labeled as representatives of the open society. However, I think this would 
be a simplistic reading of The Two Sources. In practice, any form of 
government, and any ideal view to which we may aspire, always 
presupposes a mixture of the two types of morality and religion. For 
example, exclusionary orders that close their borders to migrants or 
strangers often incorporate solidarity in their internal politics, as well as the 
ideals of freedom and equality. Conversely, those who promote the idea of 
open borders still couch their proposal in terms of legal rights. But these, for 
Bergson, are an institution of the closed society, because, according to him, 
all rule-based, legal obligations are characteristic of closed societies. So an 
open borders regime also bears traces of closure. (This is not difficult to see if 
we remember that human-rights regimes have troubling dealing with those 
whose cultural practices are not attune to the idea of legal rights of 
individuals, like patriarchal orders that put the family over the rights of 
women, for example.) So, given that political practices are always a mixture 
of the two sources, we cannot equate Bergson’s idea of the open society with 
a country willing to receive more migrants. No matter how much empathy 
migrants may inspire, the figure of the migrant is too concrete to fully 
encompass the emotion channeled by Bergson’s mystics. 
 In my view it would be a mistake to equate any particular moral 
doctrine to Bergson’s second source. The second source always resists 
concrete content because it is an intuited emotion rather than a rationally 
constructed discourse. For this reason, the source cannot be reduced to a 
specific ideal or a movement. The second source, I think, should be seen as 
the condition of possibility for creative change and the capacity for moral 
improvement: it is the condition for the emergence of new moral doctrines. 
A moral intuition from the second source seeks to turn humankind into a 
“creative effort” such that humans can change and evolve, and “turn into 
movement what was, by definition, a stop.”  
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 I do think, however, that the immigration crisis may be the shock that 
we need to tune our feelings to the second source, and be more willing to 
embrace political change. To be sure, feelings towards migrants are not 
always warm. Vulnerable migrants often trigger strong feelings of fear that 
re-enforce in-group solidarity. Yet, just as frequently, the migrants’ plight 
and their example moves individuals and societies in the opposite direction. 
Bergson helps us to understand and explain the origin of political practices 
that are generous to strangers. These changes take place when some 
individuals respond to an intuition that thrusts them towards moral 
universalization, even when it does not seem fully rational to turn in that 
direction. Their example inspires other individuals to break away from fear 
and turn towards generosity. Eventually the intuited emotion spreads across 
a society, which turns the intuition into speech, into doctrine, and eventually 
into improved practices of rule. In this particular case, the feeling that 
vulnerable migrants inspire might motivate citizens to make changes to their 
political orders; even if opening up borders or having an accepting society 
now seem impossible. Convincing nativists to extend their solidarity to 
strangers may seem far-fetched now, but this should not keep us from trying 
to go in that direction. 
 In conclusion, an open society is not strictly about open borders. It is 
about forms of political organization that allow for alternatives, and give us 
space to adapt to unforeseen circumstances. The current migration crisis is 
one among many opportunities for change. And we need to take advantage 
of these opportunities because we need political practice to better respond to 
the challenges that lay ahead. We have put undue pressure on the 
environment through uncontrolled growth, industrialization, and war. We 
will face unforeseen difficulties and new hard choices in the future. So, if we 
want to be prepared for these trials, we need to exercise our creative 
freedom and cultivate our capacity for change and moral improvement. 
 
MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: Suzanne, in your book, Thinking in 
Time, you focus on Bergson’s Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory. In 
the first, Bergson displaces intelligence to intuition; in the latter, Bergson 
deconstructs the opposition between mind and matter. You’ve been known 
to claim that The Two Sources, Bergson’s final book, produces a feeling of 
estrangement for those immersed in Bergson’s earlier texts. How would you 
describe the relationship between Bergson’s earlier and later works? Perhaps 
you can tie together some of the threads we were just laying out about 
politics, religion, and ethics. 
 
SUZANNE GUERLAC: Bergson’s early work—up through Creative 
Evolution, the work, which sealed his international reputation—has been 
filtered for us through Deleuze. From this perspective Bergson becomes a 
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philosopher of immanence, an ontologist of difference. In this respect one 
can approach the Bergsonian notion of duration from the general horizon of 
post-structuralism. The issue of mechanism or determinism against which 
Bergson deployed his philosophy of duration remains pertinent: many 
contemporary biologists define life as code. With The Two Sources, which has 
not been filtered through Deleuze, and whose territory is not so much 
ontology as a (pre-Foucauldian) social theory, we are thrust back into the 
French interwar context.  
 Whereas Creative Evolution concerns biological evolution, the The Two 
Sources concerns the possibility of social (ethical) evolution. Bergson’s 
principal interlocutor here is Durkheim, who held that the ideal of humanity 
(an ethics of humanity as a whole) serves as a regulative idea in a social 
teleology based on nineteenth century discourses of civilization (advanced 
by François Guizot in the 1830s). For Durkheim, the real unit of social 
solidarity was the nation, which, he hoped, would eventually advance to a 
more cosmopolitan ethics. Against Durkheim Bergson holds that the 
progressive realization of a rational ideal of a universally humanitarian 
ethics is a mystification, which you and Paulina were just discussing. WWI 
revealed the amorality of state sovereignty in time of war and even 
Durkheim affirmed the inevitability of war in a world of economic 
competition among sovereign nations. 
 Instead of a (Kantian) rational ethics Bergson proposes what he calls 
dynamic religion, which he characterizes as a mysticism, thereby avoiding 
all theological specificity or entanglement. Mysticism aligns with what he 
calls the “open society,” an alternative to the Durkheimian model of social 
cohesion which operates at the level of the nation, and which Bergson calls 
the “closed” society.  
 The Two Sources carries Bergson’s philosophy of life into the realm of 
social and ethical concerns. The distinction between the “closed” society and 
the “open” one plays out the difference between the (scientific) order of 
intelligence and the vital order (the order of duration that we access through 
intuition). As he writes already in Creative Evolution “If the intuition that 
accompanies science […] can be extended it can only be by mystical 
intuition.” Bergson writes that “the mystical experience extends the one that 
lead us to the doctrine of the élan vital,” and, in so doing, goes beyond the 
philosophical conclusions reached in Creative Evolution. The opposition 
between the mechanistic and the vital is rephrased in The Two Sources in 
terms of a distinction between mechanism [mécanicité] and mysticism. 
Mechanism no longer implies only a metaphysical or epistemological 
attitude. It now includes a socio-political/industrial structure and implies 
the instrumental exploitation of natural (and, implicitly, human) resources. 
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MARK WILLIAM WESTMORELAND: I think concluding with a reflection 
on Bergson’s last book is a good place to end. Brien and I want to thank you 
all for participating. It was good to hear divergent and sometimes opposing 
interpretations of Bergson. And, perhaps more interesting as we think about 
the influence of Bergson’s thought over the last 75 years is that we consider 
how his thought might be extended into contemporary problems that we 
face in the twenty-first century. 
 
 
